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We introduce a novel method for estimating a monetary policy rule using macroeconomic news. We
estimate directly the policy rule agents use to form their expectations by linking news' effects on forecasts
of both economic conditions and monetary policy. Evidence between 1994 and 2007 indicates that
the market-perceived Federal Reserve policy rule changed: the output response vanished, and the inflation
response path became more gradual but larger in long-run magnitude. These response coefficient estimates
are robust to measurement and theoretical issues with both potential output and the inflation target.
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A large literature estimates monetary policy rules of the form proposed by John B. Taylor (1993)
that relate the realized fed funds rate to past or expected future indicators of output and ination.
Examples include Charles L. Evans (1998), Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler (2000),
Glenn D. Rudebusch (2002), Michael T. Owyang and Garey Ramey (2004), Jean Boivin (2006),
Andrew Ang, Sen Dong, and Monika Piazzesi (2007) and Josephine Smith and John B. Taylor
(2009). That kind of estimation is well suited to describe what policy rule the Fed has actually
followed.
However, there is also considerable interest in what market participants expect the Fed to do.
Expectations of future monetary policy are a key part of the monetary transmission mechanism in
virtually any macroeconomic model. The Federal Reserve's expected future policy rate inuences
current interest rates immediately upon the market learning about the Federal Reserve's intentions
to stimulate or curtail economic behavior (see James D. Hamilton 2008). Moreover, Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) statements provide guidance for the direction of future policy rates
and are responded to instantaneously by the market upon their public release (see Donald L. Kohn
and Brian P. Sack 2004).
This paper proposes a novel method that enables us to uncover the market's perceived monetary
policy rule. Like many previous researchers (e.g., Refet S. G urkaynak, Brian P. Sack, and Eric T.
Swanson 2005, Jon Faust, et. al 2007, Leonardo Bartolini, Linda Goldberg, and Adam Sacarny
2008, and John B. Taylor 2010), we identify news by the dierence between a macroeconomic data
release value and the value expected beforehand by the market. On this news day, we measure the
news' eects on forecasts of both economic fundamentals and monetary policy, the latter coming
from the change in market prices for fed funds futures contracts. Our contribution is to use a
Taylor-Rule structure to link the fundamentals forecast updates with the policy forecast updates
in order to estimate the market-perceived parameters for a Taylor Rule.1
Our methodology opens up to researchers the use of daily data, which oers an opportunity to
1Others have also used news responses to study monetary policy, but in very dierent ways from that proposed
here. Steven Strongin and Vega Tarhan (1990) looked at the response of interest rates at dierent maturities to
market forecast errors of M1 to try to determine whether the response of interest rates to news represented ination
or liquidity eects. Aditi Thapar (2008) related the market's n-month-ahead forecast error to the current month's
fed funds rate innovation as measured by a recursive VAR. By contrast, our approach relates today's change in an
n-month-ahead fed funds futures contract to today's market error in forecasting current output and ination.
1avoid estimation problems engendered by potential output and the ination target. Potential output
is tricky to dene and measure in real time (see Athanasios Oprhanides and Simon van Norden
2002), and Athanasios Orphanides (2001) argues that this can confound policy rule estimation.
On the other hand, the Fed's ination target is unobservable, and moreover a growing literature,
including Peter N. Ireland (2007) and Timothy Cogley and Argia M. Sbordone (2008) among others,
has postulated an important historical role for low-frequency variation in the Fed's ination target.
The latency of potential output and the ination target poses a problem for standard policy rule
estimation methods because their values are necessary for measuring the explanatory variables. Our
method uses daily data to dierence out these slowly moving latent variables from the estimation
equations. Moreover, our approach oers a cleaner answer for how to handle real-time versus
revised data sets, by focusing on market expectations formed on the basis of the information as it
had actually been publicly released as of a particular calendar date.
By looking at the response of fed funds futures prices for contracts of dierent horizons to a new
data release, we are also able to measure how long the market believes it will take the Fed to adjust
interest rates in response to changing fundamentals. We can thereby obtain new measures of the
nature of monetary policy inertia, something that is dicult for traditional methods to estimate.
A related idea using the dierence between 3-month and 6-month T-bills has been explored by
Glenn D. Rudebusch (2002, 2006). We expand on Rudebusch's idea using the detailed structure
of a dynamic Taylor Rule formulated at the monthly level to interpret the range of responses of
1-month through 6-month fed funds futures contracts to news events isolated at the daily level.
Our estimates imply a change in the market's perception of the Fed's policy rule in terms of
both the magnitude of the ultimate response and in the degree of inertia. Since 2000, the market-
perceived monetary policy rule involves an eventual response to ination that is bigger than that
associated with perceived pre-2000 behavior. On the other hand, the market also believes that the
Fed is more sluggish in making its intended adjustments. We show in simulations with a simple
new-Keynesian model that the rst feature would tend to stabilize output, whereas the second
feature would be destabilizing. These simulations suggest that the \measured pace" of monetary
tightening during 2004-2006 may have been counterproductive.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our framework and
its testable implications. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy based on these implications
2and describes the data. Section 4 presents our full-sample results, and then shows evidence of time
variation in perceived policy response and estimates parameters on subsamples. Section 5 general-
izes the approach to estimation of a Taylor Rule with lagged adjustment dynamics and discusses
the economic signicance of those dynamics. We investigate the sensitivity of our conclusions to
various assumptions and variable decisions in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Framework
We begin with a standard Taylor Rule that is assumed by the market to characterize Federal
Reserve decisions. Let t represent a particular month and rt the average daily eective fed funds
rate for that month. The market assumes that the Fed sets the funds rate in response to the Taylor
Rule variables t  
t, the deviation from target of cumulative ination between t 12 and t, and
Yt   Y 
t , a measure of the level of the real output gap in t:
rt = r +  (t   
t) +  (Yt   Y 
t ) + ut (2.1)
where Yt is the log of real output and Y 
t is the log of potential real output.
Note that our baseline specication (2.1) follows the original formulation of Taylor (1993) and
does not include the partial-adjustment terms that have become popular in the subsequent litera-
ture. The reason is that we will be using proxies for direct market forecasts of the variables in (2.1)
at various future horizons, and will show that by comparing the dierences across dierent horizons
we can obtain direct estimates of the market-perceived adjustment lags. To explain the nature of
the evidence in the data for such lags, we will rst describe estimation under the assumption that
no lagged terms belong in (2.1) and there is no serial correlation in ut. Specically, the initial
maintained assumption is that ut in (2.1) is uncorrelated with news that the market receives on a
particular day i in month t h, as detailed below. In Section 5.2 we will generalize to a specication
in which the market perceives a dynamic path for the Fed's response to output and ination in the
form of lagged terms appearing in (2.1). For both the static and dynamic Taylor Rules we will also
be assuming that market forecasts of of the ination target 
t and potential output Y 
t are little
changed by news arriving on day i of month t   h, an assumption explored further in Section 6.2.
We will be keeping careful track in this analysis of exactly when data of dierent sorts arrives.
Let 
i;t denote the information set that is actually available to market participants as of the ith day
3Table 1: Notation
Symbol Meaning
rt Fed funds rate during month t
t ination rate (12-month ended) during month t (
 is ination target)
Yt real output in month t (yt is 12-month ended growth rate; Y
 is potential output)
 parameter controlling policy response to ination
 parameter controlling policy response to real output

i;t market information on day i of month t
f
(h)
i;t Fed funds futures contract implied rate in month t + h, quoted on day i of month t
wk;t economic indicator k, pertaining to month t
 a month h months prior to month t ( = t   h)
i(k;t) the day in month t on which wk;t 1 is released (also i(k) when t is otherwise clear)
~ wk;t 1 market expectation of wk;t 1 as of day i(k;t)   1 of month t as measured by MMS estimate
xk;t variables useful in forecasting  and y that are known as of day i(k;t)   1 of month t
;k parameter controlling how wk forecasts  (y analogous)
;k parameter controlling how ~ wk forecasts  (y analogous)
;k parameter controlling how xk;t forecasts  (y analogous)
of month t; let ~ 
i;t denote the Fed's information set at that time. The formulation (2.1) assumes
that the Fed knows the values of t   
t and Yt   Y 
t at the time it sets rt; even though t and
Yt would not be known to market participants until some later time. The framework is readily
generalizable to a case where the Fed instead sets rt on the basis of information available as of
some day j within month t:































Consider the expectation of (2.1) conditional on information available to the market as of the








































Alternatively, if we take expectations of (2.2) conditional on the information set 
i;, the identical
equation (2.3) follows due to the Law of Iterated Expectations.2 In either case, we obtain the
following expression for the change in expectations between the ith day and the previous day
2We assume that 
i;  ~ 
j;t.































































































Equation (2.4) is the key to what follows, stating that updates to the market forecast of future policy
are linked to updates to the market forecast of future economic conditions via the market-perceived
monetary policy rule. Table 1 summarizes some of the notation used in the paper.
We will consider a set of k = 1;2;:::;K dierent days within month  on which particular
information becomes available. Consider rst k = 1; which we associate with the release of, say,
the CPI. Let i(1;) denote the day in month  on which a new ination number (namely, the value
of  1) is released. For example, for  = December 2008, the CPI number reported on December
16 (i(1;) = 16) was the value for November 2008 (so that  1 became known on i(1;)): Consider
then the initial report of the value of  1 on day i(1;). We propose to capture the news content
of this report by comparing the value actually reported on day i(1;) with the value that had been















=  1   ~  1:
Our empirical estimates below will replace ( 1   ~  1) by the dierence between the initially
reported value on day i(1;) and the median forecast from the Money Market Survey.
The CPI announcement of  1 (arriving on i(1;)) triggers an update to market participants'
expectation of t. We assume that the expectation process is well captured by the linear projection
of t on the basis of  1; ~  1, and x1;, where x1; denotes a vector of other variables that would
have been known to market participants prior to the day i(1;) of month :
t = ;1 1 + ;1~  1 + 0
;1x1; + v;1;t: (2.5)
The rst subscript () on the coecients indicates that this is a coecient used to forecast sub-
sequent ination, and the second subscript (1) indicates that the forecast is formed on the day on
which the rst information variable (the CPI) is released. Note that the coecients in equation
5(2.5) are dened as linear projection coecients, so that v;1;t is uncorrelated with  1, ~  1, and
x1; by the denition of ;1, ;1, and 0
;1. The consequences of the month ; day i(1;) news















= ;1( 1   ~  1) (2.6)
where we will subsume the dependence of i(1;) on  when it is clear from the context.
The announcement of  1 may also hold implications for market expectations about real output
Yt. We assume that output exhibits a unit root, and that the market forms a forecast of the level
















Thus if the market forecasts output growth using a rule of the form
yt = y;1 1 + y;1~  1 + 0
y;1x1; + vy;1;t















= y;1( 1   ~  1): (2.7)
Note that certain elements of 0
;1 and 0
y;1 may be set to zero, depending on what elements of x1;
forecast t or yt.
Let f
(h)
j; denote the futures interest rate on day j of month  for a fed funds futures contract
based on rt; the eective fed funds rate h months ahead. We propose that these fed funds futures

















+ r;1 + qr;1;: (2.8)
Here r;1 captures the average change in the risk premium on fed funds futures contracts and qr;1;
any change in the risk premium relative to that average. In the absence of risk aversion in the
fed funds futures markets, the terms r;1 and qr;1; would be identically zero. There is certainly
good evidence for supposing the contribution of risk aversion to daily changes in fed funds prices
to be small; see Monika Piazzesi and Eric T. Swanson (2008) and James D. Hamilton (2009).3 In
3Our method works if either the risk premium is constant, as implied by the common \expectations hypothesis"
or under the implication of consumption-based asset pricing models that the risk premium would change little on
a daily basis. Piazzesi and Swanson's (2008) results indicate that \[these] risk premia seem to change primarily at
business-cycle frequencies."
6the estimation strategy adopted here, any changes in the risk premium, along with changes in the
market's expectation of the residual in the Taylor Rule, changes in the market's expectation of the
ination target, and changes in the market's expectation of potential output, are incorporated into


























































i(1) 1; = r;1 + (;1 + y;1)( 1   ~  1) + vr;1;:
Consider next a second news release in month , namely the real activity indicator y 1 released
on day i(2). For these days we employ the auxiliary forecasting equations
t = ;2y 1 + ;2~ y 1 + 0
;2x2; + v;2;t
yt = y;2y 1 + y;2~ y 1 + 0
y;2x2; + vy;2;t





i(2) 1; = r;2 + (;2 + y;2)(y 1   ~ y 1) + vr;2;:
In general, if some indicator wk; 1 is released on day i(k;); we have the following three
equations:
t = ;kwk; 1 + ;k ~ wk; 1 + 0
;kxk; + v;k;t (2.10)
yt = y;kwk; 1 + y;k ~ wk; 1 + 0





i(k) 1; = r;k + (;k + y;k)(wk; 1   ~ wk; 1) + vr;k;: (2.12)
Let z1; = (1; 1; ~  1;x0
1;)0 denote the vector including the day i(1) release of  1 and the
information available as of the day before, where we assume that z1; is uncorrelated with v;1;t,
vy;1;t; and vr;1;. Similarly, we take zk; = (1;wk; 1; ~ wk; 1;x0
k;)0 to be uncorrelated with v;k;t;
























i(1) 1;   r;1   (;1 + y;1)(w1; 1   ~ w1; 1)
i
z1;
. . .  

























Note that the ability to distinguish  from  results from using at least K  2 dierent news
releases during month . A single release such as the ination number could in principle have
implications both for future ination (as captured by ;1) and future output (as captured by y;1):
Hence any response of the fed funds futures prices to that news could come from either the policy
rule ination coecient () or output coecient (): However, ;1 and y;1 are each separately
observable (from the diering responses of t and yt to  1), so the change in the futures price
on i(1) tells us one linear combination (namely ;1 + y;1) of the policy rule parameters  and
: But the separate response to the output release on day i(2) gives us a second linear combination
(;2 + y;2). Thus, the 3K equations above are sucient to identify  and  separately.
3 Estimation
We begin this section by describing the formal estimation strategy, which is Lars P. Hansen's
(1982)Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments. Then we describe the data used.
3.1 Method


























where (h) collects the auxiliary forecasting parameters (0;0;0)0 along with the main parameters




















































As usual, the optimal weighting matrix W
(h)
T is given by the inverse of the asymptotic variance of






. In turn, we calculate a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
robust estimate4 ^ S
(h)
T of this asymptotic variance, and the ecient GMM estimator uses the inverse



































Since g() is nonlinear in (h), the minimization of (3.2) is achieved numerically. Our results
are calculated by two-step GMM starting from an initial guess provided by a simple two-stage OLS
procedure and with other initial conditions considered to obtain some assurance that the global
optimum has been found. The inconsistent two-stage OLS procedure would instead rst estimate
the auxiliary forecasting equations independently, then use these forecast parameter estimates to
generate regressors for the Taylor Rule regression.5 Joint estimation by (nonlinear) two-step GMM
is consistent and ecient { see Whitney K. Newey and Daniel McFadden (1986). We estimate each
horizon h independently from the others so that nothing other than the original data links these
estimates to one another.
As mentioned, identication is achieved by considering at least two indicators w, in which case
the system (3.2) in general is just-identied. When we use more than two indicators, the system nat-
urally delivers overidentifying restrictions. Additionally, we can impose cross-equation restrictions
that create overidentication. Our baseline specication is overidentied for both reasons.
4Our HAC estimator is that of Whitney K. Newey and Kenneth D. West (1987) with 13 lags.
5Since our framework introduces a generated-regressor, the two-stage OLS procedure is inecient { see Adrian
Pagan (1986).
93.2 Data
Fed funds futures are accurate predictors of the eective fed funds rate, as documented in numerous
studies including Evans (1998), Refet S. G urkaynak, Brian P. Sack, and Eric T. Swanson (2007),
Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), and Hamilton (2009). These contracts were rst traded on the
Chicago Board of Trade in October of 1988, though volume, especially for the longer-horizon
contracts, was initially light. For example, there were no recorded trades in 6-month-ahead futures
contracts during the entire month of February 1990. Volume increased substantially after the
Federal Open Market Committee began announcing the fed funds target in 1994 (see Figure 1),
a policy change that may have also altered the way market participants formed expectations of
future Fed policy. For this reason, we follow G urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2007) in beginning
our analysis in 1994. We end our sample in the summer of 2007 in order to avoid the period of
major nancial disruptions that started following the fund freezes by BNP Paribas that August.
Our data set thus consists of K particular days for each month over the period 1994:M1 through
2007:M6.
We require measures of ination and real activity as the dependent variables in our forecasting
equations. Note that it is the initial real-time ination release that appears on the right side of
these regressions, and so we will use real-time values on the left. We measure ination by the
year-over-year growth rate of the Core-PCE price index from the BEA. This has been the Federal
Reserve's key ination indicator over the sample we consider. We measure output growth by the
year-over-year growth rate of industrial production from the Federal Reserve Board. Both of these
series' real-time values are obtained from the ALFRED collection maintained by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. To use as much data as possible we stay at the monthly frequency and therefore
require a monthly output series. Industrial production growth has been used by previous studies to
proxy for overall output growth (e.g. James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson 2002) and is a natural
candidate for our baseline.
The economic indicators we consider are data releases from various government agencies that are
followed by the Money Market Survey (MMS).6 Following G urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005),
6In the middle of the 2000s, this survey was taken over by Action Economics.










Figure 1: Trading Volume on Fed Funds Futures Contracts
Notes: Data from Chicago Board of Trade, 1992{2003. Trading volume in number of contracts, shown as 90-day
moving average.
the median forecast provides a proxy for each variable's market expectation. MMS provides market
expectations for several candidate economic indicators. Our choice is guided by asking which
economic variables might be most helpful for forecasting output growth and core PCE ination. It
is natural for this purpose to use core CPI ination (CPIXFE) and industrial production (INDPRD)
themselves.7 In principle, all available indicators could be used, however so doing might well lead
to problems with weak instruments. With this and a desire for parsimony in mind, we look for a
few additional economic indicators to include which may provide a reasonable amount of variation
to our data. Previous literature has noted that nancial market participants scrutinize and respond
strongly to nonfarm payroll employment: for instance, see Torben G. Andersen and Tim Bollerslev
7MMS does not survey forecasts for Core-PCE ination, hence our reliance on Core-CPI ination. Fortunately,
Core-CPI forecasts Core-PCE ination well, as shown in the web appendix.
11(1998), Torben G. Anderson, et al. (2003), G urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), Bartolini,
Goldberg, and Sacarny (2008), and Taylor (2010). Therefore, we include that indicator (NFPAY)
as well. We also nd that the report of new home sales (NHOMES) provides good forecasting
power, and in particular is necessary when we rely on just the post-2000 data in some split-sample
estimates reported later. Thus the values we use for ~ wk; 1 in equation (2.13) are the median MMS
forecasts of core CPI ination, industrial production, nonfarm payrolls, and new home sales. The
values we use for wk; 1 are the actual values as released at the time (month ).








The lagged values of ination and output growth are included to control for their autoregressive
nature. For parsimony, we set to zero the rst element of y;k, the coecient on  2 in indicator k's
auxiliary forecasting equation for yt; likewise, we zero out the second element of ;k, the coecient
on y 2 in indicator k's auxiliary forecasting equation for t. The fed funds futures value for the
day before i(k)   1 is included to control for the predictive content (vis-a-vis each Taylor Rule
variable) of the futures price that has already been priced into the contract.
4 Results
First we present our full sample results using four indicators. We then show that statistical tests of
our overidentifying restrictions reject our model, and so we run tests for breaks in the policy rule
parameters and nd evidence of their variation over time. Placing the break around the beginning
of the year 2000, we present subsample estimates suggesting the market-perceived monetary policy
rule has changed over time, and repeat the overidentication tests on the separate subsamples.
4.1 Baseline
Our baseline results use four indicators { CPIXFE, INDPRD, NFPAY, and NHOMES { and impose
the cross-equation restriction that the average risk premium change is identical across indicators:
r;k = r;k = 1;2;:::;K: (4.1)
This cross-equation restriction embodies the assumption that the dierent economic indicators
systematically aect the forecasted policy rate only through changes to forecasted ination and
12Table 2: Market-Perceived Monetary Policy Rule Estimates, baseline
h
1 2 3 4 5 6
 0.345*** 0.817*** 1.134*** 1.090*** 1.633 1.687***
0.083 0.262 0.388 0.283 1.356 0.362
 0.046*** 0.057*** 0.098** 0.098** 0.067** 0.117**
0.009 0.021 0.041 0.046 0.032 0.046
Notes: The policy rule coecient on ination is  and on the output gap is . HAC standard errors in italics. The
markers *,** and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. There are 160 observations for
h = 1, 159 for h = 2, etc. The indicators are CPIXFE, INDPRD, NFPAY and NHOMES. Point estimates and standard
errors from two-step nonlinear GMM. Data run over 1994:M1-2007:M7.
output, and it adds statistical precision to our estimates; we further discuss and test this restriction
in Section 6. The policy rule response coecient estimates are presented in Table 2.8
All horizons but one exhibit ination response coecients that are signicant at the 1% level.
The output response coecient is statistically signicant and positive at the 5% level for all horizons.
These results suggest that our empirical methodology eectively extracts information from market
forecast updates that occur in response to macroeconomic news.
Our results further suggest that the market does not expect the Fed to implement changes
immediately. The response coecients at longer horizons tend to be larger than the response
coecients at shorter horizons, and 95% condence intervals for  or  often exclude the point
estimates obtained for dierent h: we denote the response coecients estimated for a certain
horizon h as (h) or (h). To perform the most powerful tests of hypotheses comparing estimates
across dierent h we would need to estimate the system jointly, which due to the large number of
parameters we refrain from doing. However, some informative conservative calculations are easy to
perform despite the fact that we have estimated parameters for each horizon h separately. Notice
that for any estimates A and B,
Var(A   B) = 2
A + 2
B   2ABAB: (4.2)
Because AB, the correlation between A and B, cannot be less than  1, it follows that
Var(A   B)  2
A + 2
B + 2AB (4.3)
8Estimates of the constant are reported in the web appendix.
13with equality only if A and B are perfectly negatively correlated. One can thus obtain a very
conservative test of the null hypothesis that A and B are estimating the same object by dividing
A   B by the square root of the right-hand side of (4.3) and rejecting H0 if the result exceeds 2
in absolute value. The test is conservative in the sense that the asymptotic probability of rejecting
H0 when it is true is less than 5%. Using this test, we conclude that (1) is statistically less than
(4) or (6).
In fact the estimates (h) are almost surely positively rather than negatively correlated, since
the futures rates for contracts of dierent horizons h almost always move in the same direction each
day. If we are willing to assume that the correlation between A and B is strictly positive, then
equation (4.2) implies
Var(A   B) < 2
A + 2
B:
If we adopt this alternative conservative test, we nd that (1) is statistically signicantly less than
(3), (4), and (6).
We thus conclude that the market believes the Fed responds to ination more aggressively at
longer horizons than it does over the next few months. The market perceives some sluggishness
or inertia in the Fed's response to news { the news warrants an immediate increase in a rational
forecast of ination and output, but the Fed is not going to respond fully to that news until several
months later. The fact that  and  are estimated to be dierent when we base the estimation
on dierent horizons h implies that something in our original model was misspecied. We will
show in Section 5 below how the dierent estimates of  and  for dierent h can be used to infer
parameters of a dynamic generalization of equation (2.1) representing the market's perceived inertia
in the response of monetary policy to news. Before doing so, however, we rst report some further
specication tests on the baseline static model.
4.2 Overidentication and Break Tests
This section conducts further tests of the assumptions motivating these estimates. We rst inves-










for m the number of overidentifying restrictions. The p-values for this test are presented in Table 3.
Recall that our baseline specication overidenties the model both by using four indicators and by
14Table 3: Overidentification Tests, baseline
h
1 2 3 4 5 6
(1) Baseline 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.032 0.025
(2) Baseline, pre 0.316 0.331 0.314 0.339 0.313 0.318
(3) Baseline, post 0.204 0.194 0.192 0.220 0.200 0.165
Notes: p-values from Hansen's (1982) J-test of overidentifying restrictions, for the baseline specications. Baseline
is the baseline specication estimated over the full sample. Baseline, pre and Baseline, post are the baseline
specications estimated over the pre-2000 and post-2000 subsamples, respectively.
imposing that the policy rule specication error means are identical for these indicators (equation
(4.1)). Row 1 displays the p-values associated with the J-statistics for the baseline specication.
We reject at the 5% level the overidentifying restrictions for every horizon h, causing some concern
that our basic framework is not consistent with the data.
A large literature has investigated changes over time in U.S. monetary policy. Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2000), Giorgio E. Primiceri (2006), and Boivin (2006) all documented a signicant
increase in the Fed's response to ination after 1979. More recently, Andrew Ang et al. (2009)
found a sharp decline in the Fed's immediate response to ination after 2001, while John B. Taylor
(2007) has argued that the Fed deviated from its historical practice in waiting too long to raise
interest rates between 2002 and 2005. For this reason, it is of substantial interest to see whether
market participants' perception of the monetary policy rule changed over our sample period.
To answer this question, we test for a break in the parameters of interest. Using Donald W.
K. Andrews' (1993)(Andrews 1993) break test, we test the null hypothesis that all parameters are
constant against the alternative that the policy rule coecients , , and r experienced a break.9
Letting the policy rule coecient vector be b = (;;r)0, we test:
H0 : bt = b0 8t  1 for some b0 2 R3
H1($) : bt =

b1($) for t = 1;:::;T$
b2($) for t = T$ + 1;:::;T

for some constants b1($);b2($) 2 R3
for values of $ in (0.25,0.75). We use the sup-Wald statistic and tabulated critical values in
Andrews (1993).






15For each horizon considered, there is strong evidence of a break in the policy rule coecients b.
In particular, for our application the 1% critical value is 16.6: the sup-Wald statistic is estimated
to be 24.9, 17.5, 29.0, 201.1, 17.1 and 258.2 for horizons 1 through 6, respectively. Moreover, each
horizon's maximal statistic occurs at similar times, near the beginning of the year 2000. In light of
this evidence, we re-estimate our baseline model on the pre-2000 and post-2000 subsamples.
Returning to the overidentication test results of Table 3, rows 2 and 3 display the p-values for
the model estimated across horizons on each subsample. We now nd that the model is readily
accepted for each subsample. Evidently, the break in the policy parameters was the major factor
in the low full-sample p-values in row 1. Once the parameters are allowed to dier by sub-period,
we nd no evidence against our framework.
4.3 Time Variation
Table 4 displays the estimation results for the two subsamples. Note that these estimates were
obtained from completely separate estimation applied to each subsample. We thus allow all the
coecients to change, including the forecasting parameters , , and . Hence the dierent esti-
mates are not attributable to changes in the way markets may have processed news between the two
samples. We now discuss the output and ination response coecients estimated in each subsample
and how they dier from one another.
Looking at the output response coecients, the output response during the 1990s is moderate
but tightly estimated. At all horizons but one the point estimates are positive and signicant at the
1% level. The response is around 0.14 in the rst month, rising to 0.43 by the fourth month. By
the alternative test, (1) and (2) are statistically less than (3) or (4). Hence the policy response
exhibits signs of gradual adjustment. However, during the 2000s the response to output changes
dramatically. The output response is tightly estimated but economically insignicant. Taken
together, this evidence suggests that during the 1990s the market perceived a moderate output gap
response that essentially vanished during the 2000s.
Looking now at the ination responses, we see that the estimates in both subsamples are
signicant at conventional levels for all horizons but one. Moreover, two noteworthy distinctions
between the subsamples are apparent. In the 1990s the ination response is quick: by the third
month the response coecient adheres to the Taylor principle of being greater than one, and
16Table 4: Market-Perceived Monetary Policy Rule Estimates, baseline pre-2000 and
post-2000
h
1 2 3 4 5 6
Pre-2000  0.356* 0.830** 1.144** 1.285** 1.571*** 1.423**
0.191 0.373 0.508 0.647 0.610 0.637
 0.141*** 0.115*** 0.318*** 0.420*** 0.127* 0.275***
0.027 0.037 0.078 0.143 0.066 0.101
Post-2000  {0.494** 0.554*** 0.405 0.420*** 1.057*** 2.031***
0.198 0.170 0.297 0.073 0.233 0.630
 0.267*** {0.066** 0.108*** {0.037** {0.053* {0.182***
0.056 0.026 0.022 0.017 0.031 0.051
Notes: The policy rule coecient on ination is  and on the output gap is . HAC standard errors in italics. The
markers *,** and *** denote signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. pre-2000, there are 69 observations
for h = 1, 68 for h = 2, etc.; post-2000, there are 88 observations for h = 1, etc. The indicators are CPIXFE,
INDPRD, NFPAY and NHOMES. Point estimates and standard errors from two-step nonlinear GMM. Data run over
1994:M1-2007:M7
thereafter stays in a range remarkably like the original Taylor rule value of 1.5. Indeed, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that these response coecients are the same, using either the conservative or
alternative tests. On the other hand, in the 2000s the ination response is gradual: it is only by
the fth month that the response is barely greater than one. Moreover, we see that in the sixth
month the response jumps to 2.03, which is rather precisely estimated. This means that (6) is
statistically greater than (1);(2);(3) and (4) by the alternative test.10
Together, these observations suggest that the market-perceived policy response to ination
changed over time in two distinct ways: during the 1990s the response adjusted at a quicker pace
with a moderate long-run magnitude, while during the 2000s the response adjusted at a slower pace
with a larger long-run magnitude.
5 Dynamic Analysis of the Policy Response
Up to this point in the paper we have been investigating our baseline specication: a static Taylor
Rule of the form of equation (2.1). We found that the implied market expectations of how the Fed
would respond to news turned out to be a function of the horizon h. News that warrants a 1%
10
(1) and 
(4) by the conservative test.
17increase in a forecast of output or ination for h = 1 to 3 months ahead results in a smaller increase
in the expected fed funds rate for that horizon than would news that warrants a 1% increase in the
output or ination forecast for h = 4 to 6 months ahead. This dierence in the estimated values for
 or  associated with dierent horizons h is inconsistent with the maintained hypothesis of a static
Taylor Rule, and suggests instead that the market perceives some inertia in the Fed's response to
news about output and ination. In this section we will postulate a dynamic Taylor Rule that
is consistent with this observed inertia. The essential property of a dynamic Taylor Rule is that
the future responses to current news vary with the horizon. Since we have already estimated that
fundamental object { future implications of current news as a function of the horizon { it turns
out that the set of estimates for dierent values of h that we have already obtained provide all the
information needed to infer parameters of a dynamic Taylor Rule. We now describe the details of
how this can be done.
5.1 Dynamic Forecasting Equations
We rst modify the earlier notation to make the dependence on the horizon h explicit, rewriting





y;k ~ wk;t h + 
(h)0







;k ~ wk;t h + 
(h)0
;k xk;t h+1 + v
(h)
;k;t: (5.2)
We will also now need a version of equations (5.1) and (5.2) for the case h = 0, in order to
keep track of the implication of the release of one indicator for the values of other indicators to be
released later that month. Suppose that the rst indicator released in month t + 1 is NHOMES,
denoted here as w1;t, followed by NFPAY, denoted here as w2;t. These releases could cause us to
update our expectation of the values for INDPRD (yt = w3;t) and CPIXFE (t = w4;t) that will be





y;1 ~ w1;t + 
(0)0
















y;2 ~ w2;t + 
(0)0





















;2 could be obtained by OLS estimation of (5.5) and (5.6). Later in month t + 1
when the output indicator w3;t is released, that allows us to know the value of yt with certainty,
which to preserve the general notation we would represent by 
(0)
y;3 = 1, and would also induce an










When w4;t is nally released, it has no implications for w3;t which is already known (
(0)
y;4 = 0) and
changes our forecast of ination one-for-one (
(0)
;4 = 1).
5.2 A Dynamic Taylor Rule






Unlike our earlier expression (2.2), equation (5.8) is strictly a backward-looking formulation, pre-
suming that the Fed responds dynamically to the history of available information; note that t 1
and Yt 1 are the most recent values available as of the end of month t.
Recall that the value of wk;t h 1 is released on day i(k;t   h), and let f
(h)
i(k);t h denote the
interest rate implied by a futures contract for settlement based on the value of rt, and quoted as of
the end of trading on day i(k;t h). For example, f
(0)
i(k);t would reect an expectation of the current
month's fed funds rate on the day that the indicator wk;t 1 is released. Take the expectation of (5.8)
conditional on market information available on day i(k;t h) and subtract from it the expectation























(wk;t h 1   ~ wk;t h 1) + v
(h)
r;k;t h:











y;k )(wk;t h 1   ~ wk;t h 1) + v
(h)
r;k;t h (5.10)
where (h) and (h) denote the original parameters whose estimates we reported in column h of
Tables 2 or 4. Comparing equations (5.9) and (5.10), the values of the dynamic parameters fj;jg


















To arrive at estimates of the dynamic parameters, we chose fj;jg6
j=1 so as to minimize the
equally-weighted sum of squared dierences between the LHS and RHS of (5.11) across indicators





h = 1;:::;6 were taken from the earlier split-sample GMM estimation reported in Table 4, while


































































































































where as before zk;t+1 denotes information available the day prior to release of wk;t. This last














y;4 = 0, and 
(0)
;4 = 1 were imposed throughout.
The resulting values of j and j are reported in Table 5. In the last column is the sum of the
parameter values across all j, which gives the long-run response to the ination or output pressure.
Recall from Section 3.1 that the parameter vector (h) for horizon h was estimated completely
independently from any other horizon. This approach of leaving the dynamics implied by f(h)g6
h=0
completely unrestricted oers at least three benets. First, nothing in our procedure requires that
the long-horizon responses should be bigger than the short-horizon responses. The fact that we
nonetheless nd them to be increasing in h is strong evidence that the market perceives policy to
respond only gradually to changing conditions. Second, if we allowed only the policy parameters to
change but not those for the forecasting dynamics, it would be possible for changes in the forecasting
20Table 5: Dynamic Taylor Rule Parameters
j
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 sum
Pre-2000 j 0.30 0.01 0.15 0.50 0.53 0.11 0.00 1.60
j 0.17 {0.02 0.10 0.20 0.00 {0.10 0.10 0.45
post-2000 j {0.63 0.70 0.26 0.35 0.00 0.46 1.05 2.19
j 0.30 {0.22 0.00 {0.02 {0.05 {0.02 {0.02 {0.03
Notes: from minimum-distance method described in text, using subsample parameter estimates across all horizons.
dynamics to show up spuriously as policy rule changes. By allowing both to change together we
are able to estimate the changes in the policy dynamics alone. Third, our procedure allows the
adjustment to inationary pressures to dier from the adjustment to real activity, similar to the
policy rules of Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans (1996, 2005).
This exibility in the rule's process is greater than that permitted by including only lags of the
policy rate itself, and our estimates suggest this greater exibility may be warranted by the data.
5.3 An example of the implication of rule changes
We now explore the economic implications of the estimated changes in the Taylor Rule in a simple
model. These results are particular to the parsimonious three equation model we choose, but
this model has been well-studied previously in the literature and therefore we consider it of some
interest.
Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), we use a standard sticky-price, rational expectations
model whose equilibrium conditions, log-linearized around a zero ination steady state, are
t = 1Et(t+1) + 2(Yt   zt) (5.13)
Yt = Et(Yt+1)    1
3 (rt   Et (t+1)) + gt (5.14)
rt = (L)t + (L)(Yt   zt) (5.15)
The rst equation (5.13) says that ination today is a function of the output gap and the expectation
of next period's ination, which in turn can be derived from an underlying Calvo pricing structure.
With relative risk aversion measured by 3, equation (5.14) is an IS schedule where today's output
depends on the ex ante real rate and the expectation of next period's output gap. Equation (5.15)
21Table 6: Effects of Changing Inflation Policy Response on the Volatility of Output
Growth and Inflation
Ination Coecients
Variable Post-Path Pre-Path Post-Path
Pre-LR Post-LR Post-LR
Both Shocks
Ination {6.0 {28.1 {32.1
Output 9.0 {12.6 {3.2
Supply Shocks Only
Ination {6.0 {28.0 {32.0
Output {0.2 1.0 0.7
Demand Shocks Only
Ination {6.0 {28.1 {32.0
Output 12.6 {18.8 {4.9
Notes: Dierences in model-implied volatility of macro variables, caused by changing the ination-response parameters
(L), relative to the pre-2000 benchmark. We consider two possible changes: (1) a change in the Path, the shape of
the dynamic response; and (2) a change in the LR magnitude, the sum of the response coecients. Output coecients
(L) are held at pre-2000 values. See the text for further details.
is a dynamic Taylor Rule that closes the model. The model's shocks are autocorrelated demand
shocks gt and supply shocks zt. We take parameter values from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)
and set 1 = 0:9967, 2 = 0:3, 3 = 1, and the shocks' autocorrelation to 0.9655 for our monthly
model. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) give supply and demand shocks the same unconditional
volatility, but we note the sensitivity of following this choice and so also report results for economies
that are only bueted by only supply or only demand shocks, respectively.
Our goal is to characterize what dierence the ination-response parameters (L) might make
for the volatility of macro variables according to this model. To do so, we x (L) at the pre-
2000 values,11 and calculate the dierence in volatilities using pre-2000 and post-2000 values for
(L). We nd that in the model the post-2000 dynamics imply a 32% reduction in the variance
of ination, as reported in the last column of Table 6, regardless of the source of uctuations in
the economy. The eect on output is small: if there are demand shocks, the volatility drops 3{5%
while if there are no demand shocks the volatility rises modestly.
We next wanted to see what it was about the post-2000 ination response that helped stabilize
ination. Was it the overall magnitude of the ination response, as reected in the sum of the j
coecients, or was it the more gradual post-2000 response, as reected in the shape of the dynamic
11Very similar results were obtained if we instead x (L) at the post-2000 values.
22response? To nd out, we explored the consequences of changing just one of these two elements at
a time. Let pre
j denote the pre-2000 ination responses and post
j the post-2000 responses. We









1 + ::: + post
6 ]
so that the sum of the coecients j was restricted to be the same as for the pre-2000 estimates,
while the shape of (L) was that for the post-2000 estimates. These results are reported in the
column labeled \Post-Path, Pre-LR" in Table 6. Such a change would have modestly reduced
the volatility of ination by 6%. If supply shocks are the only source of economic uctuation, the
eect on output would have been negligible, but if there are demand shocks output volatility rises
9{13%.
On the other hand, if we change just the long-run response, but leave the dynamics the same









1 + ::: + pre
6 ]
;
as reported in the \Pre-path, Post-LR" column of Table 6, ination volatility would be reduced
about 28%. Output would have been stabilized by 12{19% if there are demand pressures, but
becomes 1% more volatile if there are supply shocks alone.
These calculations suggest that increasing the long-run magnitude of ination response, as
the market perceives the Fed to have done, achieves the lion's share of the reduction of ination
volatility; making the ination response more gradual, as the market also perceives the Fed to have
done, detracts from output's stabilization. 12 We provide this example primarily to illustrate the
kinds of uses that could be made of the more detailed inference about dynamics that our estimation
approach makes possible, rather than to oer a denitive answer to the question of whether the
estimated changes in monetary policy subsequent to 2000 have been helpful for purposes of economic
stabilization.
It should also be acknowledged that a key source of the inertia we nd is due to the limited
response in the immediate months following new economic information. Rudebusch (2006) ac-
knowledges the existence of this kind of short-run inertia in Fed decision-making but thinks it is
12Note, however, that the benecial component of the post-2000 change is entirely attributed to the large estimated
value of 
(6) in Table 4. If this were dropped from the analysis, there would be no perceived improvement in the
long-run ination response.
23less interesting than longer adjustment delays:
Such short-term partial adjustment of the funds rate involves cutting the policy rate by
two 25-basis-point moves in fairly quick succession, rather than reducing the rate just
once by 50 basis points. This smoothing likely reects various institutional rigidities,
such as a xed monthly meeting schedule and perhaps certain sociological and political
factors. However, short-term partial adjustment within a quarter is essentially indepen-
dent of whether there is monetary policy inertia over the course of several quarters, and
this latter issue is the one that is relevant to the empirical monetary policy rules.
However, we would argue that the decision of the Greenspan Fed to increase the funds rate by only
25 basis points at each FOMC meeting over 2004-2006 is very much an issue deserving review and
likely part of the reason we estimate an increased sluggishness in the post-2000 period. Moreover,
our simple model uses exactly the inertia we nd in the data to derive the result that this form of
gradual adjustment indeed can be counterproductive.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
We next test the cross-equation restrictions imposed, and look for corroboration of the identifying
assumptions from other data sources.
6.1 Tests of Cross-Equation Restrictions
In addition to the average change in the risk premium on fed funds futures contracts, the constant
term r;k in equation (2.12) would incorporate any non-zero mean for the specication error that
represented day-to-day changes in the market forecasts of potential output, the ination target,
and the policy rule residual (see expression (2.9)). If this constant term turned out to be dierent
for dierent indicators k, that could be evidence of general mis-specication. For example, if the
indicators were in part providing signals about changes in potential output, and if the value of this
signal diered across indicators, that might show up as dierences in r;k across dierent k.
It is easy to conduct tests of the restriction (4.1) that the policy rule constant is identical across


















24where ^ R is the GMM parameter estimate subject to the cross-equation restriction r;1 = r;2 = r;3
and ^ U is the unrestricted estimate. The resulting estimates are placed in the web appendix and
summarized here. The restrictions are quite consistent with the data.
The associated unrestricted policy parameter estimates suggest that nothing substantive is lost,
and statistical precision is noticeably gained, by imposing the cross-equation restriction that the
policy rule constant is identical across economic indicators. Estimating separate policy rule con-
stants reduces the statistical precision with which we estimate the policy rule response coecients,
in particular the ination response coecients at longer horizons.
6.2 Potential Output and the Ination Target
A challenge for standard methods of estimating monetary policy rules is the diculty in measuring
potential output Y 
t and the ination target 
t. We have argued that our approach can avoid these
problems to the extent that the daily news items of which we make use have negligible consequences
for Y  or . Here we provide additional evidence on why we believe that is a reasonable assumption.
To explore this issue empirically, we will be looking at the properties of the Congressional Budget
Oce's series for quarterly potential real GDP growth, denoted y
q where q indexes quarters. If
one looks at the historical values of this series as reported in the January 2009 vintage, y
q is an
extremely smooth and highly predictable series (see the top panel of Figure 2). However, over time
the CBO will make many revisions to its estimate of the value of y
q for a given historical quarter q.
For example, on April 17, 1996, CBO estimated the growth rate of potential GDP for q = 1995:Q4
to be 1.98% (at an annual rate), whereas by January 8, 2009, they had revised the estimate for
y
1995:Q4 up to 2.76%. Orphanides (2001) and Orphanides and van Norden (2002) demonstrated
that such revisions can pose a big problem for traditional Taylor Rule estimates. Is it reasonable
to assert that the daily news events exploited in our analysis had negligible implications for these
subsequent revisions of potential GDP?
Let 
(q) denote the information set available to the public as of the 20th calendar day of
the rst month of quarter q + 1. For example, for q = 1995:Q4, 
(q) would represent information
publicly reported as of January 20, 1996. By this date, values for the percentage growth in nonfarm




















Figure 2: Potential GDP growth and long-run inflation expectations
Notes: Top panel: quarterly growth (at an annual rate) of potential GDP as estimated by the CBO as of January
2009. Bottom panel: average CPI ination rate expected over the next 10 years according according to the median
response from professional forecasters surveyed in each individual quarter.




(q); though the actual GDP growth rate for quarter q would not yet be known. Thus for
example for q = 1995:Q4, x1qj
(q) would be the growth rate of seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll
employment during the month of October 1995 as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on
January 6, 1996, while x2qj





(q)g denote the four most recent quarterly growth rates for potential
GDP as they would have been reported by CBO prior to date 
(q); for example, for q = 1995:Q4,
y
q 1j
(q) is the potential growth rate for 1995:Q3 as estimated by CBO on February 1, 1995 (the
most recent CBO estimate released prior to January 20, 1996). Finally, let y
qjT denote the potential




(q) were obtained from ALFRED, the real-time archived data set maintained by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
We then estimated the following regression by OLS for q = 1994:Q1 to 2007:Q3:
y










The coecients j can tell us the extent to which the values of nonfarm payroll growth that
arrive during quarter q could help predict the potential GDP growth rate for quarter q as it would
ultimately be reported, relative to information about potential GDP that had arrived prior to
the quarter's actual GDP report. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that 1 = 2 = 3 = 0
(F(3;46) = 0:27;p = 0:85). On the other hand, a parallel regression for predicting the actual real
GDP growth rates as eventually reported,









leads to rejection of H0 : ~ 1 = ~ 2 = ~ 3 = 0 (F(3;46) = 3:37;p = 0:03). Nonfarm payrolls contain
useful information about the current quarter's actual GDP growth but little information about the
current quarter's potential GDP growth.
We repeated the same calculations using monthly industrial production growth rates or monthly
core CPI ination rates in place of nonfarm payroll employment growth.13 We again found that
industrial production is of no use in predicting potential GDP (F(3;46) = 0:98;p = 0:41), but is
helpful for predicting actual GDP (F(3;46) = 4:06;p = 0:01), while real-time core CPI releases do
not help predict either actual or potential GDP growth. Our maintained assumption that markets
are responding to news about near-term economic conditions Yt+h and not potential output Y 
t+h
is thus fully consistent with these hypothesis tests.
In fact, even the actual growth of GDP itself as reported at the time has little correlation with
potential GDP growth as currently assessed by the CBO. In a regression of y
qjT on the GDP rate
initially reported for quarter q, 4 lags of y
q jj
(q); 4 lags of yq jj
(q), and a constant, one fails to
reject the hypothesis that the coecient on initially reported GDP growth is zero (p = 0:92).
Alternatively, one might view the market's perception of potential GDP as constructed mechan-
ically from some ltering algorithm on incoming data, which would imply that news of any sort
13Release of the December 1995 value for industrial production was delayed until January 24, 1996. We used this
January 24, 1996 release for q =1995:Q4. ALFRED's real-time coverage of the core CPI begins in 1996:M12
27by denition has some impact on perceived potential GDP. The size of this impact would depend
on the particular lter used, though in general it should be small. For example, if one associates
potential GDP with the trend component of a Hodrick-Prescott lter, a choice of  = 1600 implies
that a 1% increase in observed real GDP warrants a 0.2% increase in estimated potential GDP.14
Using  = 129;600 as recommended by Morten O. Ravn and Harald Uhlig (2002) for monthly data
would imply that an indicator that raised perceived monthly industrial production by 1% would
raise expected potential industrial production by 0.07%. If, for illustration, a 1% increase in E(Yt)
coincides with a 0.07% increase in E(Y 
t ), our estimate of  would be understated by a factor of
0.93. Although such a perspective might warrant small numerical changes in the interpretation of
our estimated coecients, we do not think it materially aects our broad conclusions.
As far as the ination target is concerned, Sharon Kozicki and P. A. Tinsley (2001) and
G urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) have produced evidence that some of the response of inter-
est rates to daily news events represents a market belief that the Fed's long-run ination target is
poorly anchored. Nevertheless, the suggestion that the FOMC is changing its long-run ination
target on a daily basis in response to the latest economic news would seem quite strange to those
who actually implemented recent U.S. monetary policy. Apart from the discrete eects of personnel
changes, some would argue that the Fed's long-run ination target should be by denition an even
smoother series than potential GDP, particularly over the period we study. Marvin Goodfriend
(2005) observed
a measure of ination favored by the Fed, core PCE ination, has remained in the 1 to
2 percent range since the mid-1990s. It is dicult to imagine circumstances that would
cause the Greenspan Fed to deliberately target core PCE ination above 2 percent in
either the long run or the short run.... Likewise, it is hard to imagine any circum-
stances in which the Greenspan Fed would deliberately target core PCE ination below
1 percent.
14Andrew C. Harvey and Albert Jaeger (1993) note that one can implement Hodrick-Prescott smoothing using

















The limiting value for the Kalman gain vector Kt can be found by iterating on equations [13.2.22] and [13.2.23] in










for  = 129;600.
28The 10-year expected CPI ination rate reported by the median respondent in the Survey of
Professional Forecasters has certainly behaved in a way consistent with Goodfriend's perception;
(see the bottom panel of Figure 2).
We investigated the extent to which changes in the expected ination rate from the SPF might
be responding to the specic news events on which we focus in a similar exercise to that described
above. Let q denote the 10-year expected CPI ination rate that respondents reported in quarter
q and let xqj
(q) denote the most recent 12-month growth rate for nonfarm payrolls as it would
have been reported as of the middle of quarter q. We estimated the following by OLS:





The test of the null hypothesis that long-run ination expectations did not respond to the most
recent nonfarm payroll numbers (0 = 0) fails to reject (p = 0:44). P-values for analogous tests
that ination expectations did not respond to the most recent industrial production (p = 0:73) and
core CPI (p = 0:76) also fail to reject.
If it were the case that market participants did revise their perception of the long-run ination
target 
t in response to the daily news events we analyze, the implication would be that the market-
perceived increase in t 
t would be smaller than that of t, resulting in a potential underestimate
of . If the nature of the revision is similar to that implied by a monthly Hodrick-Prescott lter,
the magnitude of the bias should be relatively minor for reasons of the algebra noted above.
7 Conclusion
It is important to be able to measure market participants' beliefs, manifest through their behavior,
about how monetary policy is conducted. Previous work has found fed funds futures contracts to be
excellent predictors of future Federal Reserve policy. This paper proposed that market participants
forecast future policy along with future economic conditions, and linked the two by the Taylor
Rule. This enabled us to measure the market's beliefs about how the Federal Reserve responds to
ination and the output gap. Additionally, by focusing on daily forecast updates, we are able to
nearly eliminate the impact of potential output and the ination target on our main focus: the
market-perceived monetary policy response to ination and output.
Our baseline results for the 1994{2007 sample suggest the market perceives that the Federal
29Reserve gradually responds to ination and real activity. Similar to previous literature working on
post-Volcker data, we nd the Federal Reserve follows the Taylor Principle, a greater than one-
for-one response to ination. We also nd evidence that the market-perceived monetary policy
rule changed over our sample: estimating response and forecasting coecients separately for each
subsample leads to our baseline specication being readily accepted by the data. During the
1990s market-perceived policy responded robustly to output and quickly to ination; during the
2000s market-perceived policy doesn't respond to output and responds at a more measured pace to
ination, though its long-run ination response is greater than before. We quantify the importance
of the ination response path and long-run magnitude in a standard model, and nd that raising the
long-run magnitude is eective at lowering ination volatility while making the path more gradual
is counterproductive.
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33A Web Appendix{ Not for Publication
Table A1: Policy Rule Constant Estimates
h
1 2 3 4 5 6
Baseline {0.421 {0.493 {0.578 {0.518 {0.547 {0.195
0.068 0.092 0.114 0.125 0.139 0.139
Baseline, pre {0.412 {0.489 {0.580 {0.492 {0.667 {0.624
0.109 0.091 0.080 0.199 0.132 0.186
Baseline, post {0.380 {0.469 {0.517 {0.448 {0.686 {0.644
0.070 0.082 0.119 0.124 0.200 0.145
Notes: r is the average risk premium change. HAC standard errors in italics. Point estimates and standard errors
from two-step nonlinear GMM. Data run over 1994:M1-2007:M7. Pre period is 1994{1999, Post period is 2000{2007.
Table A2: Tests of Cross-Equation Restriction
h
1 2 3 4 5 6
(4) Cross, pre 0.988 0.969 0.925 0.967 0.987 0.994
(5) Cross, post 0.999 0.997 0.996 0.957 0.999 0.976
Notes: p-values from Hansen's (1982) J-test of cross-equation restriction that the average risk premium change is
identical across indicators. Pre period is 1994{1999, Post period is 2000{2007.
Table A3: Market-Perceived Monetary Policy Rule Estimates, No Cross-Equation
Restriction
h
1 2 3 4 5 6
(4) Cross, pre  0.286 0.845 1.160 1.340 1.490 1.502
0.207 0.687 0.611 0.745 0.752 0.975
 0.137 0.128 0.348 0.434 0.130 0.305
0.046 0.049 0.248 0.354 0.085 0.112
(5) Cross, post  {0.499 0.603 0.398 0.445 1.023 2.196
0.365 0.457 0.376 0.397 0.680 0.854
 0.257 {0.101 0.088 0.002 {0.040 0.105
0.057 0.154 0.068 0.024 0.038 0.689
Notes: The policy rule coecient on ination is  and on the output gap is . HAC standard errors in italics.
See the notes for Table A2. Point estimates and standard errors are from two-step nonlinear GMM. Data run over
1994:M1-2007:M7. Pre period is 1994{1999, Post period is 2000{2007.
34Table A4: Core Inflation Predictability
h
1 2 3 4 5 6
R
2 91.5% 90.7% 89.5% 88.0% 86.2% 84.1%
t-stat 60.9 58.9 55.9 52.8 49.8 47.0
Notes: R
2 and slope coecient t-stat (robust), from regressions of Core-PCE ination on Core-CPI ination, both
as annual logarithmic rates, monthly 1960{2007.
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